

**PSCI 229 01    Fall 2008**  
**International Cooperation, Organization, and Integration**

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Why do states cooperate? What do we know about when cooperation is likely to be successful? Do states need institutions to cooperate? What do institutions do? At what point does cooperation become integration, and why would states want to integrate? Over the course of the term, we'll examine these questions and grapple with the answers. The scholarship of cooperation has a long history, dating back to the interwar period and even before, but the last decade has seen major advances in our understanding of how, when, and why states cooperate, and how that cooperation might look. We'll explore cutting-edge scholarship about cooperation itself and about state preferences and behavior for cooperation. Who wants what, and how can they get it?

**Objectives**

Specifically, after the completion of this course, you will be able to:

- Define 'cooperation' and identify theoretical characteristics that make cooperation more or less likely in a given issue area.
- Discuss the benefits and drawbacks of using international organizations at different phases of the cooperation process.
- Use the 'problems of cooperation' framework to characterize issue areas.
- Explain how characteristics of institutions affect their ability to facilitate cooperation on different issues, giving substantive examples to support your argument.
- Present arguments for and against the claim that international agreements shape state behavior.
- Explain the logic of regional economic integration and its stages, citing examples.
- Discuss practical features of day-to-day cooperation in modern international organizations.

This course has no formal prerequisites, but PSCI 120 Introduction to International Relations is recommended. Ability to navigate scholarly literature is both critical and assumed. PSCI 229 counts towards the international relations field (Area II) of the political science major. It meets the Studies in Cultural Differences Requirement as well as the Learning Across the Discipline: History and Social Sciences requirement.

**Assessment**

This course is a junior-senior level seminar. Accordingly, it will emphasize student-driven discussion. To support this goal, you will each become a 'resident expert' on one of the scholarly articles that we will read in the second part of the course. As part of your resident expert duties, you will be responsible for leading class discussion on that article, and for writing a brief (3-5 page) critical review of the article. The brief take-home assessment asks you to address issues raised by one of the books that we will read in its entirety, Keohane's highly influential *After Hegemony*. The major paper is a literature review on a class topic of your choice.

<b>Assignments</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Due</b>
In-class assignments, participation, and mini-homeworks	20%	Various dates
Keohane “exam”	15%	Sept 12
Resident Expert duties (5%) and paper (15%)	25%	Various dates
Literature Review		
Proposal and annotated bibliography	10%	Oct 8
Final paper	30%	Dec 11, 2 PM

You are expected to come to class prepared, with any assigned reading or homework completed before the start of class. You are also expected to participate in in-class activities, including but not limited to discussion. You must submit all major graded assignments of this class to pass.

**Policies:** YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL INFORMATION IN THIS SYLLABUS. Any changes to due dates or class policies will be sent to your Wooster.edu email address; you are responsible for monitoring it regularly.

**Required Materials:** This course requires three books:

- Robert Keohane. 1984 (2005). *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Helen Milner. 1997. *Interests, Institutions, and Information*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

All three titles are available at the Wilson Bookstore, and they are easily obtained online.

**Communication:** Email is by far the best way to reach me for brief questions. I typically do not read my email after 5 PM, and I normally respond within one business day. I have regularly scheduled office hours, and I encourage you to make use of them. Appointments can be scheduled on the calendar outside my office, or by email for dates not on the calendar.

**Academic Integrity, Citation, and Plagiarism:** As we will discuss on several occasions, academic honesty – giving credit where credit is due – is a key element in creating credible work. Always acknowledge ideas and text that are not your own. ***Any presentation of others’ ideas or words as your own constitutes plagiarism, and it will be prosecuted through the procedure outlined in the Scot’s Key.*** When in doubt, add a citation. There is no such thing as having ‘too many cites,’ but having too few cites is called plagiarism.<sup>1</sup> If you are unfamiliar with citation conventions in US academic writing, *please consult me or a reference librarian*. For this course, you must use the American Political Science Association (APSA) citation style; links to the style guides are on Woodle, and the manual itself is on EReserve.

**Special Needs:** If you have a medical or other condition or circumstance which could interfere with your ability to achieve your best performance in this class, including any which may entitle you to extended testing time or other accommodations, ***please consult with me as soon as possible*** to make appropriate arrangements.

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<sup>1</sup> This statement originates with Prof. Cindy Bair van Dam at American University, I believe; at a minimum, she was the first to say it to me. A statement like this constitutes acknowledgement that the expression is not my own.

**Attendance and Conflicts:** After two unexcused absences (absence without documentary evidence of family emergency or medical attention for illness), expect a grade penalty. I reserve the right of final determination of the excusability of an absence. In accordance with the *Code on Conflicts*, students with family responsibilities, athletic or extracurricular commitments, or religious conflicts should indicate these *as soon as possible*; accommodations are not possible without sufficient notice.

**Due Dates and Extensions:** Assignments are due at the start of class on the indicated day. Absence from class on a due date does not grant an automatic extension. Extensions are granted only in cases of medical or religious conflict or other major situation. Late work will be penalized at least one grade.

### **Tentative Schedule of Course Topics**

Reading assignments are subject to minor adjustments if more topical material becomes available. Items indicated (ER) are available on eReserve; our password is “international” (no quotes). Items indicated with \* are available for resident expert selection. Each day’s required items are listed first; you should generally read in the order listed unless I mention otherwise in class. Recommended reading is optional and is included for your convenience in writing your literature reviews. Items marked (W) are linked on Woodle.

M, Aug 25      Orientation and Overview

#### ***International Cooperation and Regimes***

W, Aug 27      The Logic of Cooperation

Sandler, Todd. 2004. *Global Collective Action*. Cambridge [UK]: Cambridge University Press. Ch 2-3 (ER)

Axelrod, Robert, and Robert Keohane. 1985. “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy.” *World Politics* 38: 226-54. (ER)

#### Recommended:

Powner, Leanne C. Walk-Through: Strategic Form Games; and/or related handout. (W)  
Gruber, ch 2.

Oye, Kenneth A. (ed). 1986. *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

Stein, Arthur. 1990. *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mitchell, Ronald B., and Patricia M. Keilbach. 2001. “Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange.” *International Organization* 55,1: 891-917.

Milner, Helen V. 1992. “International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses.” *World Politics* 44,3: 466-96.

M, Sep 1      Hegemonic Stability Theory

Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” *World Politics* 28,3 :317-47. (ER)

Lake, David. 1993. “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch?” *International Studies Quarterly* 37: 459-89. (ER)

Keohane, Ch 1.

Recommended:

- Powner, Leanne C. 2007. Reading and Understanding Political Science. (W)
- Conybeare, John. 1984. "Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas, and the International Political Economy." *International Studies Quarterly* 28,1: 5-22.
- Cowhey, Peter, and Edward Long. 1983. "Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline or Surplus Capacity?" *International Organization* 37,2: 157-88.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1898. "Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?" *World Politics* 41,3: 307-24.
- Keohane, Robert. 1997. "Problematic Lucidity: Stephen Krasner's 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade.'" *World Politics* 50: 150-70.
- McKeown, Timothy. 1983. "Hegemonic Stability Theory and Nineteenth Century Tariff Levels in Europe." *International Organization* 37,1: 73-91.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." *International Organization* 39, 4: 579-614.

W, Sep 3 Hegemonic Stability, Minus the Hegemon  
Keohane, Ch 2, 3, 4.

M, Sep 8 (H)ST and Institutions  
Keohane, Ch. 5, 6, 8.

W, Sep 10 Parting Thoughts and Shots  
Keohane, Ch. 9, 10, 11.

M, Sep 15 Getting Cooperation in Other Ways  
Gruber, Ch 3, 4, 5.

**Keohane "exam" distributed.**

Recommended:

Powner, Leanne C. Walk-Through: Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction. (W)

W, Sep 17 International Regimes  
Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." *International Organization* 36,2: 195-205. (ER)  
Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36,2: 379-415. (ER)

Recommended:

Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. 1997. *Theories of International Regimes*. Cambridge [UK]: Cambridge University Press.

M, Sep 22 Unstructured Cooperation  
Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, 1: 3-32. (ER)  
Lipson, Charles. 1991. "Why are Some International Agreements Informal?" *International Organization* 45, 4: 495-538. (ER)

**Keohane "exam" due.**

Recommended:

Powner, Leanne C. 2008. *Consensus, Capacity, and the Choice to Cooperate*. PhD Diss, University of Michigan Ann Arbor: Ch 4.

W, Sep 24

The Stages of Cooperation

Morrow, James D. 1994. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation." *International Organization* 48: 387-423. (ER)

Powner, Leanne C. 2008. *Consensus, Capacity, and the Choice to Cooperate*. Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor: Ch 2. (W)

Recommended:

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes. *American Political Science Review* 79, 4: 923-42.

Krasner, Steven. 1991. "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier." *World Politics* 43,3: 336-56.

M, Sep 29

Bargaining Problems and Enforcement Problems

Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining and Enforcement in International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52,2: 269-305. (ER)

Drezner, Daniel. 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?" *International Organization* 54,1: 73-102. (ER)

***International Bargaining and Institutions***

W, Oct 1

Two-Level Games

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42,3: 427-60. (ER)

Eichenberg, R.C. 1993. "Dual Track and Double Trouble." In *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, ed., Evans et al., Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: pp. 45-76. (ER)

Martin, Lisa L., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1993. "US Policy and Human Rights in Argentina and Guatemala, 1973-80." In *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, ed., Evans et al., Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: pp. 330-362. (ER)

Recommended:

Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds. 1993. *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

M, Oct 6

Issue Linkage

Sebenius, James K. 1983. "Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties." *International Organization* 37,2 : 281-317. (ER)

Lohmann, Suzanne. 1997. "Linkage Politics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41: 38-67. (ER)

Dür, Andreas, and Gemma Mateo. "Treaty-Making in the European Union: Bargaining, Issue Linkages, and Efficiency." *European Integration Online Papers*. 2004.

[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=603921](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=603921). (ER)

W, Oct 8

Interests ...

Milner, Ch. 1, 2

**Literature review proposal due.**

M, Oct 13

**No class. Fall break.**

- W, Oct 15 Institutions...  
Milner, Ch. 3, 4
- M, Oct 20 and Information  
Milner, Ch. {two of 5, 6, 7, 8}, 9
- W, Oct 22 IOs: Nuts and Bolts of Major Institutions  
Pease, Kelly-Kate. 2008. *International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Ch. 2.  
Browse UN and EU websites, plus one other IO website  
Excerpt from Duncan et al. (HO)
- Recommended:  
Pease, Kelly-Kate. 2008. *International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- M, Oct 27 Forum Shopping  
\* Alter, Karen, and Sophie Meunier. 2006. "Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute." *Journal of European Public Policy* 13,3: 362-382.  
[TBA.]
- W, Oct 29 Compliance  
Simmons, Beth. 1998 "Compliance with International Agreements" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 1:75-93.  
Downs, G., et al. 1996. "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50,2: 269-306. (ER)  
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47: 175-205.
- Recommended:  
Koh, Harold Hongju. 1997. "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?" *Yale Law Journal*. 106, 2599
- M, Nov 3 Compliance, Examined  
\* Simmons, Beth A. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *American Political Science Review* 94, 4: 819-835.  
\* Von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99, 4: 611-622.
- W, Nov 5 ***Issues, Institutions, and Institutional Design***  
The Problems of Cooperation and Institutional Design  
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55,4: 761-99. (ER)  
\* Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. "Contracting Around International Uncertainty." *American Political Science Review* 99, 4: 549-565. (ER)
- Recommended:  
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, eds. 2001. *The Rational Design of International Institutions*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- M, Nov 10 Trade, Integration, and Trade Institutions  
Ginsberg, Roy H. 2001. *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Ch. 3 (excerpt). (ER)  
\* Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61,1: 37-68. (ER)

Recommended:

Mansfield, Edward D. 1998. "The Proliferation of Preferential Trading Arrangements." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42,5: 523-43.

- W, Nov 12 Economic Regionalism  
\* Mansfield, Edward, and Helen Milner. 1999. "The New Wave of Regionalism." *International Organization* 53,3: 589-628. (ER)  
Gruber, Ch 6, 7.

Recommended:

Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. 2006. "Collective Action Problems and Regional Integration in ASEAN." *CSGR Working Paper 198/06*. Center for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation.

<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2006/wp19806.pdf>

Mansfield, Edward D., and Eric Reinhart. 2003. "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements." *International Organization* 57,4: 829-862.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. "Democracy, Veto Players and the Depth of Regional Integration." *World Economy* 31,1: 67-96.

- M, Nov 17 Trade Disputes and International Design  
\* Busch, Marc L. 2007. "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *International Organization* 61,4: 735-62. (ER)  
\* Smith, James McCall. 2000. "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts." *International Organization* 54,1 (Winter): 137-80. (ER)

Recommended:

Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55,4: 829-57.

- W, Nov19 Security Cooperation  
\* Kydd, Andrew. 2001. "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement." *International Organization* 55,4: 801-28.  
\* Morrow, James D. 2007. "When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101,3: 559-72. (ER)  
\* Morrow, James D. 2001. "The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties." *International Organization* 55,4: 791-991. (ER)

Recommended:

Haftendorn, Helga, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallender. (eds.) 1999. *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- M, Nov 24     Human Rights  
\* Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe." *International Organization* 54, 2: 217-252.  
\* Keith, Linda Camp. 1999. "The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36,1: 95-118.  
\* Neumayer, Eric. 2005. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, 6: 925-953.

Recommended:

Hathaway, Oona. 2007. "Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51,4: 588-621.

- W, Nov 26     Environmental Protection  
Sandler, Todd. 2004. *Global Collective Action*. Cambridge [UK]: Cambridge University Press. Ch 10. (ER)  
\* Raustiala, Kal, and David G. Victor. 2004. "The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources." *International Organization* 58,2: 277-310. (ER)  
\* von Stein, Jana K. 2008. The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52,2: 243-268. (ER)

Recommended:

DeSombre, Elizabeth. 2002. "The Evolution of International Environmental Cooperation" *Journal of International Law and International Relations*. 1(1-2) Winter 2004/Spring 2005.

<http://www.jilir.org/docs/vol1no1-2/JILIR%201%281-2%29%20DeSombre-Evolution%20of%20International%20Environmental%20Cooperation.pdf>

Downs, George W. 2000. "Constructing Effective Environmental Regimes." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:25-42.

Young, Oran R. 1994. *International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society*. Ithaca [NY]: Cornell University Press.

Mitchell, Ronald B. 2006. "Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements." *Global Environmental Politics* 6, 3: 72-89.

M, Dec 1     Flex Day, Student-Proposed Topics Day, or Conferencing About Papers

W, Dec 3     Wrap-Up  
Gruber, Ch 10

**FINAL PAPER DUE:**

Thurs, Dec 11, 2 PM (start of scheduled final exam time)  
to Prof. Powner by email.