

Chapter 3

When Do States Cooperate? The Case of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy*

Chapter 2 established a framework for understanding foreign policy behavior. Its key insight is that cooperation emerges from institutions only when both consensus and capacity exist together. This chapter begins testing the consensus and capacity framework by examining states' choices to cooperate through the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It emphasizes factors that might facilitate or inhibit consensus, including characteristics of cooperation in institutions more generally, and of the European Union (EU) in particular. This allows us to begin to answer the question of, "When do states cooperate through international institutions?"

EU foreign policy is an appropriate locus for testing theories about cooperation in institutions for two reasons. First, the EU has a number of similarities to other organizations active in foreign policy cooperation during this era. Its membership represents the core of all other foreign policy institutions, and CFSP – like other international organizations – is fully intergovernmental and allows national vetoes.¹ These elements suggest that theories predicting cooperation in the EU will also have some success in other organizations as well.

Second, the EU differs in key ways from the other European foreign policy cooperation bodies, and these differences help to make the EU a particularly appropriate test for arguments about cooperation. The foreign ministers of the EU meet more frequently than in any other institution, and procedures exist for cooperation between meetings. Moreover, the EU's

* This chapter has been reformatted from dissertation margins, etc., to conserve paper. Other than the addition of this note, it is identical to the submitted and accepted version of the dissertation.

¹ The supranational elements of the EU, specifically the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, are excluded from participation in the foreign policy cooperation process.

jurisdiction is unlimited; it is not confined by geographic region or issue areas. These two characteristics give the Union the best possible chance of reacting to foreign policy events. A theory that can predict cooperation in the most-likely venue will then have justification for testing in narrower circumstances.

This chapter first draws on the existing literature to establish hypotheses about cooperation, and more specifically about cooperation in formal international organizations. It considers characteristics of cooperation as a general phenomenon, characteristics of foreign policy as an issue area, and characteristics specific to the EU as a forum for cooperation. The second section addresses issues of research design, including sampling methods and the importance of including all types of negative cases in the analysis. The third section tests the hypotheses and discusses the results. The final section concludes.

Explaining Cooperation

As Chapter 2 suggested, extant scholarship identifies conditions that facilitate cooperation; these conditions usually relate to achieving consensus in the group. The literature does not, however, go on to test its claims against an unbiased dataset. In this chapter, I identify variables that the consensus-capacity framework argues would facilitate cooperation in formal institutions. Since the existence of consensus and capacity cannot be measured or observed directly, though, I identify and measure variables that theory presumes would affect the existence of either consensus or capacity.² In the case of foreign policy cooperation, these variables include factors related to cooperation in general (regardless of issue area), and issue-specific factors related to foreign policy cooperation. Finally, since I test these hypotheses using the EU's CFSP

² C.f. (Ehrlich 2007).

as a forum, we must also consider characteristics of the EU as an institution that might influence the choice to cooperate.

Characteristics of Cooperation in General

Previous studies of international cooperation as a general phenomenon have identified a number of factors that influence states' ability to achieve cooperation. Four are relevant to this study: centralization, distribution problems, institutional socialization processes, and the number of members in an institution. I address each in turn.

Abbott and Snidal (1998) argue that states choose to pursue cooperation through formal international institutions at least in part because of the centralization benefits that these institutions provide. Centralized information provision and distribution, bargaining, monitoring, dispute resolution, enforcement, and other similar features increase benefits to states by decreasing the costs of cooperation. Multilateral bargaining facilitates issue linkage,³ and increasing the amount of common knowledge among participants can help to decrease information problems. By doing these things, institutions can help to improve the chances that the members will reach consensus on a particular agreement that benefits all of them. Since this dissertation addresses conditions that lead to cooperation, rather than the phases after cooperation itself, the hypothesis only addresses benefits of institutions that accrue before or during cooperation.⁴

³ (Sebenius 1983).

⁴ In other words, I set aside the compliance debate now. As one justification for this decision, Ginsberg (1989) and others argue that foreign policy cooperation is generally a coordination problem, in which no or few incentives to defect exist. In this case, concerns about compliance and enforcement are minimal and should not influence behavior substantially. In contrast, a second argument from Axelrod (1984) and Fearon (1998) claims that concerns about the future enforceability of particular bargains can impede reaching agreement at the bargaining stage, which suggests that institutional enforcement powers should influence the initial decision to cooperate. As neither the EU

H1: Measures that promote centralization of bargaining, decision-making and information provision should increase the probability of cooperation.

A second prominent factor that can impede states' ability to reach a consensus on cooperation is the existence of distribution problems. Distribution problems occur when the actors hold different preference orderings over the set of possible outcomes – they disagree on which outcome is most desirable. Chapter 2 emphasized that international organizations decide by unanimity or consensus. Unlike most domestic legislating or decision-making bodies, outliers in international organizations have the ability to veto any form of cooperation that would be worse for them than the status quo or other reversion outcome. Additionally, the cost to other states of buying off or compensating outliers rises sharply as the outliers become more extreme, so that strategies of issue linkage or side payments may no longer be viable. Together, these factors suggest that the probability of achieving consensus, and by extension cooperation, is less likely as participating states' preferences diverge.

H2: Increases in the magnitude of the distribution problem should decrease the probability of cooperation.

A third element that may influence states' likelihood of cooperation is the existence of socialization processes within institutions. Socialization is the process by which states internalize the norms and roles associated with membership in a particular group.⁵ This process occurs over time as actors come to understand the expectations associated with their roles and react to social pressure to conform to these expectations.⁶ We should expect, then, that as time passes and

nor the other institutions considered in Chapter 4 have formal enforcement powers, any bias from my exclusion of enforcement concerns should be constant across all cases and institutions.

⁵ (Johnston 2003); (Bearce and Bondanella 2007).

⁶ Even if rates of internalization differ across states, the hypothesis should hold so long as the rate of internalization is positive in all states.

actors gain experience both in their roles and in the institution, consensus and therefore cooperation should become more likely.⁷

H3: Increased time of exposure to an institution's rules and norms should increase the probability of cooperation.

Finally, changes in the institution, particularly increasing the number of members, may affect cooperation. Enlargement of an institution brings, at a minimum, increased transaction costs of bargaining with a larger number of states. Additionally, the new member(s) will alter the preference distribution of the membership, so that the median preference of the group is likely to change. The net result of more members, though, regardless of their preferences, should be a decreased chance of cooperation.⁸

H4: An increase in the number of members should decrease the probability of cooperation.

Enlargement may also have some social effects. Immediately after enlargement, the new members require time to adjust to their new roles and to complete their internalization of the organization's norms of behavior, and the old members must adjust to the new dynamics of the enlarged group. As states complete these adjustments, however, the immediate impact of enlargement should decline and the rate of cooperation should stabilize at some new equilibrium level. The social effects of enlargement, then, should be especially pronounced immediately after enlargement but dissipate with time.⁹

⁷ A parallel rationalist argument exists for socialization effects. States update their perceptions about, e.g., the distribution of member state preferences and the effects of institutions through each additional set of interactions. Socialization, then, is nothing more than the process by which the marginal change from each round of updating reaches some low and stable level.

⁸(Koremenos et al. 2001).

⁹ A parallel rationalist argument exists here as well, suggesting that states instead need to update their perceptions of member preferences and to identify new potential coalition partners in the changed bargaining space. Perhaps the only difference in empirical predictions between this hypothesis and the social effects of enlargement one above is that in a world of full rationality actors should calculate updated perceptions with very little time lag. As a result, we

H4a: After a membership change, the probability of cooperation should decrease sharply and then move back towards its previous level after some time lag.

Characteristics of Foreign Policy

Issues of security and conflict resolution often involve crisis management and rapid decision-making, or what Wagner (2003) describes as “fast coordination.”¹⁰ These events in many ways demand a response from the international community; conflict and instability spread without regard for borders. Rapidly moving events on the ground leave small windows of opportunity where a collective policy has some chance of achieving its goals. Under these conditions of minimal bargaining time, even a small distribution problem can potentially block cooperation in organizations with unanimity voting rules.

This brief bargaining window, however, perhaps masks an underlying consensus on the need for cooperation on these kinds of issues. The EU’s members are for the most part small and medium-sized states. None of them – with the potential exception of France and the UK – have the capacity to influence foreign conflicts and emergent conflicts independently, and even those two great powers have limited independent operating capacity.¹¹ This leaves the EU’s member states with no choice but to cooperate if they wish to influence most global events. The

should not see an effect of enlargement for this reason – there should be no shock-and-dissipation effect, only the permanent effect of the increased distribution problem and greater numbers of members. A finding of insignificance on the coefficient testing Hypothesis 4a would suggest support for this alternative argument.

¹⁰ Michael E. Smith, however, explicitly contends that CFSP is “not explicitly designed [for] quick crisis management using military means.” Since the EU takes no military action on events in this sample, and since all events had equal opportunity for non-military responses such as declarations and the dispatch of assistance, this should not be an issue. In any case, fast coordination can involve non-military responses. (M. E. Smith 2004, 196).

¹¹ Both states have only minimal long-range transport capability, in particular, and lack deployable field command centers.

combination of lack of individual capacity and a consensus on the importance of preventing the spread of violence should make crisis issues more likely to receive some type of response.¹²

H5: Crisis issues are more likely to result in cooperation.

That said, a variety of types of crises exist, and different kinds of crises carry different effects on the probability of cooperation. For the purposes of this project, crisis issues include incidents that threaten international security, domestic security within a non-EU state (e.g., large-scale rioting, hostage situations involving foreign nationals or armed combatant groups, civil conflict), and efforts to resolve ongoing domestic or international conflicts (e.g., peace talks, deployment of peacekeeping missions). Given differences among the EU's member states about security policy, as I address below, we might expect these three groups of conflicts to have different response patterns.

First, all groups of states in the EU agree that conflict resolution is desirable; indeed, this priority is enshrined in CFSP's founding Treaty. A second consensus may also exist that international security crises, where war is imminent (or may have already occurred), deserve a response calling for peaceful resolution of the situation and/or condemning the use of force. These two points suggest that both conflict resolution and security issues are *more* likely to receive CFSP responses.

A third possibility, though, is that differences between member states on the optimum institution for creating cooperative security policy would result in *less* cooperation on security issues than on other types of issues. Some member states of the EU, as I discuss below, have a strong preference for using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Exploring possible

¹² The Union itself lacked military (or civilian) crisis response units until the creation of the 1999 European Defense and Security Policy. The resultant "Rapid Reaction Force" was not operational until late 2001 and did not deploy in response to any of the events in this sample.

substitution effects between the EU and NATO is the focus of Chapter 4, but we must acknowledge that under the EU's unanimity voting rules, these NATO-preferring states may block security policy cooperation there in favor of pursuing it elsewhere.

H5a: Issues of conflict resolution are more likely to receive a response.

H5b: Issues of international security are more likely to receive a response.

H5c: Issues of international security are less likely to receive a response.

Event salience may also play a part in provoking cooperative responses. Salience, or “the extent to which an issue is temporally compelling to policymakers,”¹³ can affect policymaking by helping to define the set of issues on which actors consider cooperation appropriate or useful. Media coverage also plays a key role here. Highly salient events on which no reaction is forthcoming may trigger discontent at home for governments; citizens become aware of salient events through their own news media and may pressure the government to respond.

H6: Events that are more salient should be more likely to receive a response.

Finally, geographic proximity should affect cooperation. Nearby events have the potential to spill over into the territories of the acting states. The risk of this kind of contagion should prompt cooperation from potentially affected states to try to prevent it. Moreover, the EU's move towards open internal borders (the Schengen Agreement) at the time could lead contagion to spread widely and rapidly.¹⁴ The possibility of contagion should attract more EU attention to its geographic region than elsewhere.

¹³ (Busby 2007, 252).

¹⁴ At the same time, many states in the EU's geographic neighborhood were applying to join the EU. The EU's “Copenhagen criteria” placed strict elements of conditionality on accession, including that the candidates respect human rights, protect cultural minorities, and conduct politics democratically. The enlargement process created a strong system of monitoring for all states that expressed interest in joining, which should also increase the EU's attention to its own neighborhood. This element of concern about the region is perhaps more a characteristic of the EU as an institution rather than foreign policy as an issue area, but detangling the two effects is not possible here. See also (K. E. Smith 1999) on enlargement as a form of foreign policy.

H7: Events in nearby states should be more likely to receive a response.

EU-Specific Characteristics

Three features of the EU itself may influence the probability of CFSP cooperation on an issue: devices within the Union's policymaking system that create an underlying consensus on some issues, the existence of two other Union bodies that also act in foreign policy, and the EU's strong internal leadership system. I address each in turn below.

Pre-Existing Consensus

Two structures allow the EU to create underlying consensus on issues before specific events occur. First, the EU has established several priority issue areas for CFSP. The Treaty on European Union (Article 11, ex J.1) identifies these as the promotion of human rights, democratization, regional integration, international security, and conflict resolution. The inclusion of these issues in the treaty implies that some baseline degree of consensus exists about the importance of Union activity in these issue areas, which should increase the probability of CFSP activity. The prior section addressed activity on security and conflict resolution issues. As additional examples, the EU conditions a range of development, pre-accession, and other aid on the recipient state's human rights behavior and on progress towards democratization.¹⁵ In addition, the Union frequently takes positions and introduces resolutions in major international human rights bodies.¹⁶ These patterns should carry over into the EU's behavior more generally.

H8: Events in issue areas specified by the Treaty as priority areas should be more likely to receive a response.

¹⁵ (Williams 2004).

¹⁶Karen E. Smith (2006) also introduces data showing that the member states are still individually active in these fora, alongside their collectively introduced positions. This raises interesting questions about how states weigh the benefits of unilateral action in this context, where they clearly also perceive some (joint and/or individual) gain from collective activity.

Second, the EU may have previously developed common policy on an issue that establishes a level of consensus about policy. In particular, the EU's Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, in force 1999) took steps to address problems of policy coherence across time and issue areas by creating a new type of policy instrument, the Common Strategy. Common Strategies adopt a holistic view of the EU's activity on a particular issue (e.g., environmental protection in the Mediterranean), or relations with another country (e.g., Russia), and are the basis for all future policy on that issue. These Common Strategies presumably represent the establishment of a unanimously agreed set of foreign policy objectives.¹⁷ If so, then after the EU adopts a Common Strategy, any issues that arise under its purview should have an increased probability of cooperation, since the Common Strategy negotiations would have resolved some of the distribution problems.¹⁸

H9: Events on which the Union has already established a Common Position should be more likely to receive a response.

Substitutability

CFSP, however, is not the only branch of the EU that acts in foreign and security policy. In particular, the European Commission and European Parliament (EP) both play roles in the EU's external policy. First, the EU's Council of Ministers has delegated certain tasks, particularly the allocation and administration of humanitarian aid, to the Commission. As a result

¹⁷ (Ginsberg 2001, 48).

¹⁸ I ignore the problem of which issues or topics receive Common Strategies for now. The extended negotiations on the small number of Strategies that were adopted suggest that the choice of issues was based on substantive relevance or political importance, rather than a 'low-hanging-fruit' approach. If Common Strategies were only adopted where consensus already existed, then negotiations would not have been as protracted as they were. Also, if the intended targets of such strategies were going to be issues on which consensus existed, then little reason would have existed for the creation of such a policy instrument. The desired policy coherence would have already existed as a function of the consensus.

of this delegation, Commission activity may be a possible substitute to or complement for Council action in the CFSP.

Second, while the EU's founding treaties make no reference to EP in foreign policy, the Parliament has carved out its own role. The Parliament's activity mainly takes the form of passing a substantial number of resolutions each year to state its reaction to world events. It is particularly vocal about human rights abuses, with the rhetoric of its statements often going far beyond what the Council, as a body composed of states and their representatives, might otherwise be willing to say.¹⁹ This suggests a possible substitute or complement relationship here as well, and one might surmise this is particularly true in human rights issues. The Council might consciously or unconsciously defer to Parliament to say things that it cannot.²⁰

H10: Activity by other EU institutions may substitute for CFSP action and decrease the chance of a CFSP response.

H10a: European Parliament activity on an event should reduce the chance of a CFSP response.

H10b: European Commission activity on an event should reduce the chance of a CFSP response.

Institutional Leadership

Finally, the leadership of the EU may also affect cooperation. Leadership in the EU, and most particularly in CFSP, emerges from a presidency that rotates among members every six months. The presidency has a substantial amount of influence over the agendas of Council meetings, including those that approve CFSP documents; its representatives also chair drafting committees and work groups. Presidency staff draft and circulate statements to other member

¹⁹ For an example of the Parliament's outspokenness on human rights matters, see their 2001 resolution on the sexual abuse of women, especially Catholic nuns by priests. (European Union. 4-2001, 1.2.1).

²⁰ Unfortunately, this dataset does not allow testing of the latter conjecture; an interaction term for *EP* activity and *Human Rights Issues* was too collinear to include in any models.

states for written approval between meetings.²¹ The presidency state can also use its position as the external ‘face of the Union’ to direct attention to issues it considers important. The slow-moving nature of the policy process tempers the presidency’s ability to shape the Union’s policy agenda somewhat, but the presidency does have some influence.²²

These institutional prerogatives of the presidency should allow a state to amplify the influence of its preferences during the term in which it holds the presidency.²³ We might expect this tendency to be particularly pronounced for states whose foreign policy preferences are not near the middle of the group’s distribution. These states are able to use their vetoes to block unacceptable policy, just like all other states, but they also have the ability to prevent undesirable items from reaching the agenda, to create texts in line with their own preferences that may not be acceptable to the rest of the group, and to convene working groups on issues of importance to them. If states are as attentive to their own interests during their term in the presidency as they are at other times, these abilities should generally result in less cooperation as the outlier presidencies make use of their temporary powers. Even though norms in the EU encourage the state holding the presidency to act impartially and in the Union’s interests rather than its own, setting aside some deeply ingrained preferences may create major domestic costs for outlier presidencies and so encourage them to violate the norm.²⁴

H11: Events during the presidency of a state that is a preference outlier should be less likely to receive a response.

²¹ (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006, 172).

²² (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006, 166-67).

²³ (Edwards 2006, 55); Schalk et al. (2007) provide evidence of presidency effects in Pillar I (economic affairs) bargaining.

²⁴ Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006:176) argue that the presidency’s strong “brokerage” role in CFSP demands impartiality to be successful. My argument suggests that outlier presidencies are less impartial than more centrist states (and thus less effective at achieving cooperation) as a result of domestic or other pressure on them to protect their relatively extreme preferences.

In European foreign policy, the primary dimension on which states can be outliers is security policy. Two distinct European security identities exist: formally neutral states and states with an “Atlanticist” orientation in their security policy.²⁵ Formal neutrality is a fairly extreme position in that its formality makes it a more rigid form of non-alignment, which is more extreme than a policy that allows for flexible or short-term alignments. When security issues arise, a neutral state holding the presidency may prefer to step aside and defer to another security-oriented institution or ad hoc grouping in which it does not participate, rather than to try to lead cooperation itself.

On the other hand, Wivel (2005) argues that the peaceful resolution of disputes is often a critical component of security policy identity for small and neutral states. We might expect, then, that neutral states would become more involved in conflict resolution, particularly by offering mediation or other “carrots” to support conflict resolution processes. Neutral presidencies should preside over more foreign policy cooperation in conflict resolution issues than other types of presidencies.²⁶

Similarly, we may expect that states with an Atlanticist foreign policy orientation – those with a strong and persistent preference to use NATO as the primary institution for security issues – would be more likely to defer to NATO or some other institution to act, and thus would be less likely to use the EU for these issues during their presidencies.²⁷

²⁵ Chapter 4 provides a more extensive discussion of these identities. All states who are not Atlanticist or neutral in this context are described and coded as noncommittal.

²⁶ A neutral presidency might also make a particularly active effort to exert leadership during its tenure to demonstrate that its neutrality was not going to impede the development of CFSP. Several observers believe that this occurred during the initial presidencies of Austria, Sweden, and Finland. These states had repeatedly declared during the accession process that they would participate fully in the CFSP, including in its security components. (Ferriera-Pereira 2004).

²⁷ Conflict resolution is not a salient component of Atlanticist security identities, so no hypothesis exists for the conjunction of those two characteristics.

H11a: Security events during the presidency of an Atlanticist state should be less likely to receive a response than other types of events.

H11b: Security events during the presidency of a neutral state should be less likely to receive a response than other types of events.

H11c: Conflict resolution events during the presidency of a neutral state should be more likely to receive a response than other types of events.

Research Design

In the preceding subsections I established a set of hypotheses about when cooperation should occur in CFSP. This section addresses the methodological obstacles to studying the question of *when* cooperation happens, particularly the importance of studying unsuccessful cases and the challenge of obtaining a sample of events chosen without reference to their outcomes.

The quantitative study of EU foreign policy activity patterns dates back to Ginsberg (1989), who examined whether a range of foreign policy actions from 1958 to 1985 were prompted by pressures associated with interdependence, externalization of internal policies, or a “self-styled” logic related to then-EC’s conception of its place in the world. In explaining the causes of the EU’s actions, however, Ginsberg’s research design reveals a critical gap: an inability to know about what causes an action to occur in the first place. The study of only successfully concluded instances of cooperation, and the relative frequency of causes associated with successes, tells us nothing about what prompts action – only about the characteristics of successful action.²⁸ The proportion of successful cases that result from externalization-based pressures, for example, tells us little about the incidence of externalization pressures in world

²⁸ A similar statement would describe the current compliance literature – we know when states will comply with the agreements they have made, but we still have little sense of when they would have made an agreement in the first place, let alone why they signed the agreement that they did. As Chapter 2 argues, the sample of successfully completed agreements is in itself a biased sample; the agreements that states did *not* sign cannot be enforced, nor would states have been likely to comply with them had they been signed.

events more broadly. Without knowing this, we cannot understand whether externalization pressures are more likely to produce cooperation than are other potential causes. Ginsberg reports (number of successful cases under one particular logic) / (number of successful cases under all logics). Making the claim about which of Ginsberg's logics is most likely to result in cooperation requires knowing something about the quantity (number of successful cases under this logic) / (total number of cases where states *could have* cooperated under this logic even if they did not). This limits Ginsberg's conclusions to stating that "the logic of *x* is the most common reason for cooperation" rather than making claims about causality.

Ginsberg's choice to study only successful outcomes was a reasonable first cut at the study of EC/EU foreign policy activity, given the paucity of existing data and computing resources at the time. Unfortunately, though, it introduces an issue of selection bias into the analysis. When success (cooperation) could result from any of several causes, we can only distinguish between the causal patterns by studying cases where these causes are both *present and absent* in different combinations, and where *variation* in outcomes exists.²⁹ Negative cases are thus essential to unbiased causal analysis.³⁰

The practice of looking for (and looking at) the 'dogs that did not bark' is common in large-n empirical political science. Scholars of international conflict, for example, have often assumed that states have the *option* to go to war with one another every year. This assumption allows them to approximate the population of all possible cases of war – both negative and

²⁹ By not including negative cases, Ginsberg is effectively trying to explain a constant – cooperation – with a variable (type of "logic"). If externalization causes cooperation, and interdependence causes cooperation, then what causes non-cooperation?

³⁰ Geddes (2003) and Achen and Snidal (1989) make powerful cases for careful case selection. Studying only the 'success' cases involves an implicit assumption on the analyst's part that the relationship between outcome and independent variables is the same across the independent variable's full range of values, and this can be dangerous – and sometimes misleading – if the variable that causes 'success' correlates with another underlying variable.

positive – by studying all dyad-years in the international system.³¹ But how do we identify cases where foreign policy cooperation potentially *could* have happened, but did not?

Rather than a dyad-year strategy or another approach that attempts to approximate the population of cases, I have instead created a random sample of international events that represent the plausible targets of foreign policy cooperation by states and/or one or more European foreign policy institutions. To build a dataset that represents the full universe of cases, I first took a random sample of pages from *Keesing's Contemporary Archive*, a monthly global news digest, and used a random number generator to select which qualifying international event from each entered the final sample. The resulting double-random sample of 300 events is broadly representative of the types and distribution of issues that states confront in foreign policy.³² It contains events in a wide range of issue areas and at varying levels of prominence and urgency.

The dataset spans the period 1994 to 2003, representing the first full year of CFSP operation to the last full year before the EU's enlargement from 15 to 25 members. The exclusion of the earliest post-Cold War years has both practical and theoretical justifications. First, in practical terms, the CFSP did not exist until November 1993. Prior to this, European foreign policy cooperation occurred under the rubric of "European Political Cooperation." This system was explicitly not institutionalized; it existed outside the treaty frameworks with the exception of the (rather small) Council Secretariat being charged to support EPC as well as Council activity in EC matters.

³¹ Lewis and Lewis (1980) establish a typology of negative cases and argue for their inclusion in data collection and analysis projects.

³² The sample excludes foreign economic policy issues. The Appendix contains further details and justifications about the sample selection process and coding rules.

Second, theoretically speaking, the earliest post-Cold War years were a time of great change when state interests were uncertain.³³ Events in this period are not likely to reflect the same kinds of dynamics as during periods of (increasing) preference stability. This uncertainty and fluctuation in preferences in the early post-Cold War period would confound the causal patterns that the consensus-capacity framework tries to explore by increasing the difficulty for states of estimating the preferences of their partners.

Theoretical and practical reasons also prevent the extension of the dataset beyond 2003. First, the accession of 10 states to a body that previously contained only 15 represents an enormous shock to the system. Decision-making dynamics changed substantially as the new member states joined or created coalitions on various issues.³⁴ The foreign policy backgrounds of these new states are incredibly different from older member states, to the point where we might expect substantially different theoretical models of preference formation and policy behavior from them. These factors likely make pooling pre- and post-2004 events inappropriate. Moreover, in practical terms, few of these new member states have widely accessible documentation of their foreign policy during the earlier part of the study period. This would result in substantial amounts of non-random missing data, which would undermine the study's analysis.


The sample used here consists of 300 observations of randomly selected international events. The EU's norm of not addressing events that involve its member states or that occur on members' territory (i.e., the norm of *domaines réservés*) means that the eighteen observations

³³ (Ginsberg 2001, 16).

³⁴ (Edwards 2006).

occurring inside the EU drop from the sample.³⁵ This leaves 282 observations for analysis in this chapter. Figure 3-1 displays the distribution of these remaining events by region of origin.³⁶

Figure 3-1. Distribution of Events by Region.



Understanding Patterns in EU Foreign Policy Cooperation

The following subsections test the hypotheses developed above on the effect of variables related to cooperation in institutions, foreign policy as a broad issue area, and EU-specific characteristics. In all models that follow, the unit of observation is an event from the random event dataset described above. Likewise, the dependent variable in all models is whether the EU made any type of formal response: issuing a statement or declaration, or conclusions; passing a Common Position; or undertaking a Joint Action.³⁷ Table 3-1 shows the distribution of EU cooperation over time on events in the sample.

³⁵ The dropped intra-EU observations return to the analysis in Chapter 4.

³⁶ The category of “International” is *Keesing’s* classification for events, issues, or developments that are global in scope. Examples of this (not all of which are in the sample) include the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the crisis in the aviation industry after 9/11, the opening of a new UN General Assembly session, an FAO report on the extent of world hunger, etc. They have no target or region of origin, so in any models where “Greater European Region” is variable, these observations are coded 0. I

³⁷ For our purposes, differentiating between these subgroups is not necessary. Statements, declarations and conclusions pool as low-cost rhetorical behaviors, and Joint Actions and Common Positions pool as higher-intensity behaviors that require resource commitments.

Table 3-1. CFSP Activity by Year.

	<i>No Activity</i>	<i>Activity</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% Successful Cooperation</i>
1994	20	7	27	29.3%
1995	22	5	27	18.5%
1996	20	6	26	23.1%
1997	15	12	27	44.4%
1998	20	8	28	28.6%
1999	22	7	29	24.1%
2000	16	8	24	33.3%
2001	21	10	31	32.3%
2002	21	9	30	30.0%
2003	23	10	33	30.3%
Total	200	82	282	29.1%

The decision to code declarations and conclusions as foreign policy activity deserves some discussion, especially in light of debates in the CFSP literature on whether these rhetorical moves actually represent cooperation beyond what the states themselves would have done individually.³⁸ First, both rationalist and constructivist arguments suggest that public statements serve a function in foreign policy. For constructivists, such statements can contribute to creating or shaping the global discourse about a particular issue; they can also be part of a process of ‘naming and shaming,’ in which states and international organizations try to use social pressure to change the target state’s behavior. For rationalists, public statements can generate audience costs and serve as costly signals. Not all statements will have this effect – many are probably cheap talk – but where the statement makes a threat or promise, the audience costs of the statement may help the actors commit to that path of action and signal their credibility to the

³⁸ See, e.g., Davidson (1997/98); Hoffmann (2000). In effect, these authors argue that CFSP serves more as a forum for foreign policy *coordination* than *cooperation*, as Keohane (1984, 51-52) defines it.

target.³⁹ Neither of these functions requires that states commit themselves to anything beyond what they would otherwise have done.

As additional justification for treating declarations and statements as forms of cooperation in this project, consider the following two arguments. If declarations are cheap or costless, then states or international organizations should issue them on more – or even all – events. But at the same time, if joint declarations are simply what states would do anyway and are thus unlikely to have any additional effect (i.e., have a low probability of achieving success when used alone), then why do states use them at all? The existence of 80 instances of declarations or statements in the dataset poses a puzzle, especially since 70 of those instances occur where no form of higher-order (resource-committing) cooperation occurs. In these arguments, the content of the declarations is beside the point; their mere *existence* is the puzzle.⁴⁰

Declarations and statements are actions that require consensus among the participants but only a minimal level of capacity. Unfortunately, these events comprise the majority of cooperation successes in the dataset. Testing hypotheses related to institutional capacity is not possible in this dataset, since it includes only twelve instances of higher-order cooperation involving the commitment of resources (i.e., Joint Actions and Common Positions). This is insufficient variation to obtain reliable estimates in ordered models. Similarly, the institution's membership, structures and/or resources do not change substantially during the period of study (1994-2003), so testing capacity arguments is not possible in this context either. As a result, I defer discussion of capacity variation to Chapter 4.

³⁹ See Morrow (1994) on cheap talk and Fearon (1997) on costly signals. The possibility exists as well that the actor's intended audience for the statement is others beside the target state: other states, domestic publics, other international organizations, etc.

⁴⁰ The other two instances of EU activity in the dataset are ones with higher-order but no lower-order cooperation: a Common Position on the opening of voter registration in what was widely expected to be a fraudulent election in Nigeria, and a Joint Action related to the postponement of municipal elections in Bosnia as a result of irregularities in registration.

Cooperation in Institutions

Hypotheses 1 through 4 consider characteristics of cooperation in institutions that should affect the probability of observing it: distribution problems, socialization, the number of members, the effects of membership change, and the centralizing role of institutions. Variables to capture these concepts were coded especially for this study.

I measure the severity of the distribution problem using the Comparative Manifesto Project's Left-Right orientation scale. The Government Orientation scale weights the preferences of the parties in government by their share of the government's parliamentary majority, then sums the weighted party scores. The emphasis here is on the *dispersion* of preferences, rather than their precise location, so I take the standard deviation of the mean EU member government preference, measured monthly. This coding accommodates changes in government during the year and is reasonably reflective of the Council's composition at each meeting.

Left-right preferences are a crude proxy for foreign policy preferences, since we might expect that ideologically similar governments would share at least some common preferences in foreign policy.⁴¹ I use the left-right ideological positions rather than the positions on European integration measure because coding of the latter conflates all dimensions of European integration into a single indicator ("all positive references to European integration" – "all negative references to European integration"). The left-right variable includes positive and negative codings on thirteen different elements.⁴²

⁴¹ Whether governments of the left or right are more inclined to international cooperation is an open empirical question beyond the scope of this chapter; the use of the standard deviation of mean preferences renders the point irrelevant. Chapter 4 addresses justifications for and objects to the use of manifesto data in more detail.

⁴² (Marks, et al. 2007). Coding all European issues in a single variable conflates issues of economic integration (often favored by the right but opposed by the left) with issues of social integration (often favored by the left and

Socialization is a process with few overtly observable characteristics. By definition it is a process of internalization of norms and roles or identities, meaning that the key elements of the process occur inside the minds of participants. What we can observe, however, is the occurrence of events or behaviors that scholars theorize contribute to socialization. Chief among those is repeated exposure to or participation in the desired behaviors, and/or extended periods of practicing a given role.⁴³ To capture this, I use the time in months between the event and the creation of the CFSP. The data sample used here, 1994-2003, begins just after the creation of CFSP in November 1993, and so this captures almost the entire extent of state exposure to and activity under CFSP's rules and structures.⁴⁴ Since CFSP functions through a series of (typically) monthly meetings on a range of professional levels, the use of a month-based indicator measures exposure to these rules and expected behaviors in a fairly direct manner.

As an indicator of the number of members, I use a dummy variable coded 1 for all events that occur after the EU's "Northern Enlargement" on January 1, 1995. This is functionally equivalent to a variable that indicates the number of members and changes from 12 to 15 on that date, but the dichotomous variable facilitates interpretation.

To capture the social effects of enlargement – that the alteration in membership is a shock to the established social system in the group – I use three indicators with differing rates of decay. Table 3-2 displays these rates of decay. This allows me to vary the shape of the decay function (linear in Enlargement 2 and Enlargement 3; nonlinear in Enlargement 4), the rate of decay (slopes of -0.25 in Enlargement 2 and -0.33 in Enlargement 3), and also the time required for the

opposed by the right) and political integration (where party orientation predicts irregularly). As a result, the European Integration variable is very noisy, and so I opt not to use it here. See also (Aspinwall 2007).

⁴³ (Johnston 2003); (Bearce and Bondanella 2007).

⁴⁴ The creation of CFSP codified EPC but added formal institutions and new policy tools, including tools for action as well as declarations.

effect to dissipate (24 months for Enlargement 2; 18 for Enlargement 3 and Enlargement 4). The six-month intervals each correspond to a term of the presidency in the EU.⁴⁵ The varying shapes of the decay functions are all monotonically negative, but they differ in the distribution of that dissipation over time.

Table 3-2. Values of Dissipating-Enlargement-Shock Variables.

<i>Term (Presidency State)</i>	<i>Enlargement 2</i>	<i>Enlargement 3</i>	<i>Enlargement 4</i>
Jan-Jun 1995 (France)	1.0	1.0	1.0
Jul-Dec 1995 (Spain)	0.75	0.66	0.5
Jan-Jun 1996 (Italy)	0.5	0.33	0.25
Jul-Dec 1996 (Ireland)	0.25	0	0
Jan-Jun 1997 (Netherlands)	0	0	0

Finally, Hypothesis 4 suggested that institutional features that led to increased centralization should improve the chances of cooperation. In 1999, the EU's Treaty of Amsterdam came into effect, bringing with it several enhancements to the CFSP that increased centralization. The Treaty of Amsterdam created a "High Representative" for the CFSP, who is a proto-Foreign Minister; this individual serves as the EU's mediator in a variety of global crisis situations and also works to increase the public visibility of CFSP.⁴⁶ The Treaty also created the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which assembles senior foreign service officers of the member countries to generate common strategic analyses and policy papers. It aims to improve the chances of consensus by creating a unified understanding of 'the problem' at or before its emergence, rather than waiting for states to develop their own positions and working backward to a consensus.

⁴⁵ I discuss the presidency and its role in greater detail below. For purposes here, the presidency is the common time unit for understanding EU activity. Because each presidency enters with a policy agenda, each six-month period is effectively a distinct policy cycle, even though completion of some initiatives may well continue for a year or more afterward.

⁴⁶ The presidency serves as the public face of CFSP, but with the presidency rotating between states every six months, the EU's leaders felt that a permanent face would help personalize and personify CFSP to the ordinary citizen.

I test these hypotheses using a probit model, with standard errors corrected for clustering on major groups of events (i.e., Middle East peace process, Bosnia, etc.).⁴⁷ As the results in Table 3-3 show, none of the hypotheses about characteristics of cooperation in general receives even mild support in the data. No specification produces a significant coefficient, even under the more generous one-tailed tests presented in the table. Hypotheses from both the rationalist and constructivist ‘conventional wisdom about cooperation are equally unsupported by this model. Possible reasons for this include the somewhat simplistic measurement of most variables and the admittedly partial model specification.

⁴⁷ Probit specifications are appropriate because the dependent variable is binary (cooperate or not); clustered standard errors allow for possible non-independence of events in clusters. 72 cases of success appear across the 288 observations. Rare events logit maximizes its usefulness with a ratio of 1 success to 2 failures; the current specification is approximately 1:3. Thus, the rare events procedure is unlikely to produce substantially different results than the current estimations. See King and Zheng (2001).

Table 3-3. Probit Model of EU Activity and Characteristics of Cooperation in General.

	Model A			Model B			Model C			Model D		
	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>
<i>Preference Dispersion</i>	-0.050	0.058	0.195	-0.050	0.056	0.186	-0.045	0.056	0.212	-0.038	0.077	0.310
<i>Socialization (Time)</i>	0.006	0.006	0.162	0.006	0.007	0.203	0.004	0.007	0.264	0.005	0.006	0.225
<i>Centralization</i>	-0.430	0.429	0.158	-0.431	0.448	0.168	-0.399	0.458	0.192	-0.392	0.454	0.194
<i>Enlargement</i>	-0.034	0.417	0.468	-0.041	0.315	0.449	0.052	0.322	0.436	0.014	0.509	0.489
<i>Enlargement 2</i>	--	--	--	0.011	0.524	0.492	--	--	--	--	--	--
<i>Enlargement 3</i>	--	--	--	--	--	--	-0.152	0.507	0.382	--	--	--
<i>Enlargement 4</i>	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-0.161	0.427	0.354
<i>Constant</i>	0.095	0.942	0.460	0.100	0.901	0.456	0.028	0.903	0.488	-0.080	1.24	0.475
Log pseudolikelihood	-169.30			-169.300			-169.21			-169.22		
Pseudo-R ²	0.004			0.004			0.005			0.005		
<i>N</i>	282			282			282			282		


Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. *p*-values represent one-tailed tests.

Characteristics of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy as an issue area includes many fast-moving events with broad ramifications for the international system. This is particularly true for wars and conflicts, which cause avoidable death and suffering and which may spread to neighboring states. The variable *All Crisis Issues* captures all issues with security ramifications, including issues classified as both domestic and international peace and security, and issues of domestic and international conflict resolution.

A second factor that may affect foreign policy cooperation is the event's level of salience. Highly salient events – those obtaining much media coverage and that other members of the foreign policy community (including the media) perceive as important – should also be more likely to receive a response. To capture salience, I use the word count of the article in *Keesing's Contemporary Archive* from which the event was selected. These word counts are logged to reduce the influence of outliers; in addition, all entries over four pages long have an arbitrarily high word count of 1000. Figure 3-2 displays the distribution of (logged) salience in the sample.

Figure 3-2. Frequency Distribution of Salience (Logged).



Finally, geographic proximity may affect foreign policy cooperation behavior since many forms of crisis and conflict spread easily over national borders. In the case of the EU, the variable *Greater European Region* captures all events in non-EU Europe (including Turkey) and the former Soviet Union.⁴⁸

Table 3-4. Probit Models (Minimal) of EU Activity and Foreign Policy Characteristics.

	Model A			Model B		
	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>P</i>	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>
<i>All Crisis Issues</i>	0.396	0.137	0.002	0.321	0.141	0.012
<i>Greater European Region</i>	0.123	0.140	0.191	0.077	0.134	0.284
<i>Salience (logged)</i>	--	--	--	0.491	0.112	0.000
<i>Constant</i>	-0.767	0.167	0.000	-3.203	0.650	0.000
Log pseudolikelihood	-166.75			-157.66		
Pseudo-R ²	0.019			0.073		
<i>N</i>	282			282		

Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. *p*-values represent one-tailed tests.

Table 3-4 provides a preliminary test of hypotheses related to characteristics of foreign policy as an issue area. Model A is a limited model, examining only Hypotheses 5 and 7. *All Crisis Issues* has a positive and significant relationship with CFSP responses. In this limited specification, geographic location is not related to EU cooperation. Overall, the model performs poorly.

Model B expands the set of explanatory factors slightly by adding *Salience* to test Hypothesis 6. *Salience* is highly significant, with a large and positive effect. With all else held at its median value, moving *Salience* from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above increases the probability of cooperation by 21.76%. *All*

⁴⁸ A longstanding norm prohibits the EU from using its foreign policy mechanism to address or respond to events in the EU itself; these observations are excluded from the dataset, and so coding them as part of the “Greater European Region” is not necessary in this chapter. On *domaines réservés*, see, e.g., (M. E. Smith 2000).

Crisis Issues retains its positive and significant relationship in this specification, but *Saliency* alone accounts for some 5.2% of the model's explanatory power.

The models in Table 3-5 disaggregate *All Crisis Issues* into its component parts and examine them separately to test Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c. Model A examines the combination of *All Security Issues* (both domestic and international) and *All Conflict Resolution Issues*. First, disaggregation improves the model's fit by an additional 2%. This represents a substantial increase over the extremely low level of variation explained by Table 3-4's models, though the overall variance explained remains low. Second, the model suggests that the EU is significantly more likely to respond to *Conflict Resolution Issues*, but no relationship appears to exist between *All Security Issues* and CFSP activity. This suggests that two different causal processes are at work in these sub-issues.

Model B continues the disaggregation process by considering only *International Security Issues*, which are the primary focus of the hypotheses, and *Conflict Resolution Issues*. The results, however, parallel the findings in Model A; *Conflict Resolution Issues* and *Saliency* remain significant, and *Greater European Region* and *International Security Issues* are not. Model C, which reintroduces *Domestic Security Issues* as a separate variable, produces comparable results. Neither *Security Issue* variable approaches significance at conventional levels.

Table 3-5. Probit Model of EU Activity and Characteristics of Foreign Policy.

	Model A			Model B			Model C		
	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>P</i>	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>
<i>All Security Issues</i>	0.158	0.156	0.155	--	--	--	--	--	--
<i>All International. Security Issues</i>	--	--	--	0.059	0.129	0.323	0.063	0.132	0.317
<i>All Domestic Security Issues</i>	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.124	0.166	0.227
<i>All Conflict Resolution Issues</i>	0.603	0.177	0.001	0.583	0.178	0.001	0.602	0.177	0.001
<i>Greater European Region</i>	0.057	0.116	0.317	0.056	0.115	0.313	0.055	0.116	0.317
<i>Salience (logged)</i>	0.487	0.114	0.000	0.496	0.114	0.000	0.489	0.114	0.000
<i>Constant</i>	-3.201	0.653	0.000	-3.206	0.667	0.000	-3.207	0.653	0.000
Log pseudolikelihood	-155.00			-155.30			-155.10		
Pseudo R ²	0.088			0.087			0.088		
<i>N</i>	282			282			282		
Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. <i>p</i> -values represent one-tailed tests.									

To summarize, the models in this section produce strong support for Hypothesis 6 on the role of event salience in predicting CFSP responses. Salience alone accounts for a substantial portion of the model's explanatory power. Hypothesis 7 on geographic proximity, however, receives no support here. Neither pooled indicators of all crisis issues, nor disaggregated variables reflecting international and domestic security issues, have significant relationships with CFSP activity. Hypotheses 5b and 5c thus both lack support. Hypotheses 5a, however, gains considerable support; conflict resolution issues are a significant predictor in all models in which they appear. Moreover, disaggregating the crisis issues in this manner explains less variation than the pooled model, which is unexpected since conflict resolution and security issues appear to behave very differently.

EU-Specific Characteristics

Specific characteristics of the EU as a venue should also influence cooperation. First, the Treaty on European Union, which created CFSP, specifies five priority areas as “objectives”⁴⁹: international security, conflict resolution, democratization, human rights, and regional integration. Because these are part of the Treaty, and the Treaty required the unanimous consent of the member states, we should expect that a greater underlying consensus exists on these issues and that we should see more cooperation on them.⁵⁰ The following models reflect two codings of the issue areas. Model A in each table shows the treaty issues pooled into a single variable (*All Treaty Issues*); Model B disaggregates the issue areas into separate variables.

⁴⁹ (European Union 1991, Art 11, ex J.1).

⁵⁰ Each event may code as up to two issue areas. For example, violence erupted at the opening of the Haitian Legislature in 1994. As this was both an instance of substantial domestic unrest, it codes as a (domestic) security issue, and since this was the first democratically-elected legislature, it also codes as democratization issue.

Second, and for similar reasons, we might also expect issues on which the EU has established a Common Strategy to be more likely to receive responses from the Union. As I discussed above, the negotiations to produce the Common Strategies should have helped to resolve many of the underlying distribution problems on that issue and to establish a basis for future policy. Because a Common Strategy is both fairly recent and also fairly detailed, we would expect its effect to be stronger than that of treaty issues; it would both reflect current member state governments' preferences and also have addressed distribution problems on more specific issues. To capture this, I create a dichotomous variable where events on which the Union had established a Common Strategy have a value of 1.

Third, CFSP is not the only component of EU external activity. Two other EU bodies, the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP), make statements, and the Commission also acts in international affairs. As the discussion above suggested, the behavior of these two bodies may either substitute for or complement CFSP activity. The dichotomous variables *Commission* and *EP* capture action by these bodies.⁵¹

Finally, Hypothesis 11 proposed that the preferences of the state holding the EU's rotating presidency should influence the Union's propensity for cooperation. The powers of the presidency may allow the state holding it to express its preferences more fully during its term in office than it might otherwise. *Preference Outlier* captures whether the presidency state has a constitutional or other legally-binding commitment to neutrality or nonalignment in its security policy (Ireland, Finland, Sweden, or Austria), or a historically Atlanticist security policy orientation (the UK, Germany, Spain, and Denmark). These states have distinct preferences that

⁵¹ I do not test Hypothesis 11 (the general substitute/complement hypothesis) directly with a variable that captures action by either body. The different powers and resources granted to the two bodies would make pooling inappropriate as it would conflate the very different processes underlying each body's behavior.

are far from the median preference, and we might reasonably expect them to behave differently.

Therefore, *Preference Outlier* codes both of these types of presidencies as 1 and all others as 0.⁵²

Table 3-6. Probit Models of Cooperation as a Function of EU-Specific Variables.

	Model A			Model B		
	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>
<i>All Treaty Issues</i>	0.475	0.121	0.000	--	--	--
<i>All Security Issues</i>	--	--	--	0.213	0.219	0.165
<i>All Conflict Resolution Issues</i>	--	--	--	0.756	0.194	0.000
<i>All Human Rights Issues</i>	--	--	--	0.080	0.225	0.362
<i>All Democratization Issues</i>	--	--	--	0.396	0.158	0.006
<i>Regional Integration</i>	--	--	--	0.228	0.197	0.123
<i>Common Strategy</i>	0.845	0.350	0.008	0.931	0.356	0.005
<i>European Parliament</i>	0.958	0.280	0.001	0.984	0.281	0.000
<i>Commission</i>	0.132	0.324	0.342	0.053	0.352	0.441
<i>Pref. Outlier Presidency</i>	-0.100	0.142	0.241	-0.143	0.142	0.159
<i>Constant</i>	-1.046	0.168	0.000	-0.986	0.196	0.000
Log pseudolikelihood	-155.64			-151.79		
Pseudo-R ²	0.085			0.107		
<i>N</i>	282			282		

Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. *p*-values represent one-tailed tests.

Table 3-6 shows two probit models of EU cooperation. Model A pools all the Treaty-specified issues into a single variable; Model B disaggregates them. In Model A, strong and significant effects appear for both *All Treaty Issues* and *Common Strategies*. Being a treaty issue increases the probability of a CFSP response by 13.33% over the baseline of 15.00%; having a Common Strategy results in an increase of 27.61% percent.⁵³ Given the rather low baseline, these increases are substantively significant as well – nearly doubling for treaty issues and nearly trebling for issues with a Common Strategy. The *European Parliament*'s behavior is also a

⁵² Later models disaggregate this variable into Neutrals and Atlanticists.

⁵³ All other variables held at their medians (0); calculations performed in Stata 8.0 using CLARIFY ((King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000); (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001)). Baseline represents all variables set to 0.

significant predictor of cooperation ($p < 0.000$), though its sign is positive. This strongly suggests that a CFSP response and EP behavior are complements rather than substitutes.⁵⁴

Model B's picture is more nuanced, showing the separate effects of the component issue areas in the Treaty. The bulk of the Treaty's influence appears to come from two issues, *Conflict Resolution* ($p < 0.000$) and *Democratization* ($p < 0.006$).⁵⁵ *Regional Integration* marginally misses conventional levels of statistical significance in a one-tailed test ($p < 0.123$), even with a control for Commission activity on that event. *Security* and *Human Rights* issues, however, are insignificant ($p < 0.155$ and 0.362 , respectively).⁵⁶ *European Parliament* activity continues to have a strong and significant positive relationship, though as before, the coding procedures prohibit any causal conclusions from this finding. The influence of *Preference Outlier* presidencies, however, becomes substantially more certain, though it too still fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.159$, one-tailed test).

Table 3-7 extends the analysis by disaggregating the preference outliers into neutral and Atlanticist states. Model A, with the pooled treaty issues, suggests that the two types of outliers do indeed behave differently. *Atlanticist Presidencies* appear less likely to cooperate, though the coefficient just misses conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.107$, one-tailed test). *Neutral Presidencies* have an unexpected positive sign though they are nowhere near statistical significance.

⁵⁴ The coding of the data does not, however, allow us to determine whether EP behavior leads to CFSP action, or vice versa. Coding procedures captured whether the EP or Council made any reactions to the event/issue within a standard time frame of two months before the event to one month after. It did not capture the specific dates of the reactions. In any case, these dates would be influenced by preset meeting schedules to an extent where the enactment dates themselves are fairly meaningless unless they are separated by some significant span.

⁵⁵ That the EU is more likely to act on conflict resolution issues is no surprise to EU scholars and practitioners. Hill (2004:155) notes, "The EU is good at the theory of conflict resolution, if nothing else."

⁵⁶ The lack of significance on *Security* is perhaps not surprising given the range of security policy preferences in the EU, as I discuss below.

Table 3-7. Probit Models Disaggregating Preference Outliers.

	Model A			Model B		
	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>P</i>	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>
<i>All Treaty Issues</i>	0.498	0.125	0.000	--	--	--
<i>All Security Issues</i>	--	--	--	0.239	0.218	0.136
<i>All Conflict Resolution Issues</i>	--	--	--	0.771	0.196	0.000
<i>All Human Rights Issues</i>	--	--	--	0.104	0.228	0.325
<i>All Democratization Issues</i>	--	--	--	0.413	0.158	0.005
<i>Regional Integration</i>	--	--	--	0.285	0.213	0.091
<i>Common Strategy</i>	0.827	0.347	0.009	0.914	0.347	0.004
<i>European Parliament Commission</i>	0.959	0.282	0.001	0.984	0.285	0.001
<i>Commission</i>	0.150	0.330	0.325	0.066	0.353	0.426
<i>Atlanticist Presidency</i>	-0.192	0.155	0.108	-0.228	0.157	0.074
<i>Neutral Presidency</i>	0.048	0.184	0.397	-0.006	0.176	0.486
<i>Constant</i>	-1.069	0.171	0.000	-1.010	0.201	0.000
Log pseudolikelihood	-155.15			-151.40		
Pseudo-R ²	0.087			0.110		
<i>N</i>	282			282		

Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. *p*-values represent one-tailed tests.

Model B disaggregates both the outliers and the treaty issues. *Security and Human Rights* issues remain insignificant, and *Regional Integration* moves from marginal to significant ($p < 0.09$, one-tailed test). Common Strategies and EP behavior remain significant while Commission activity continues to be insignificant. Turning to the preference outlier presidencies, Model B presents clear evidence that the two types of outliers do indeed behave differently. *Atlanticist Presidencies* are now significantly less likely to preside over cooperation than states with the median (noncommittal) security policy preference ($p < 0.074$), as theory predicts. Holding all other variables constant at their medians (0 in this case), moving from a noncommittal presidency to an Atlanticist one decreases the probability of cooperation by 4.92%. *Neutral Presidencies* remains highly insignificant; this suggests that these states behave in a very similar way to states with median preferences.

Table 3-8 presents tests of interaction hypotheses 11a, 11b, and 11c. These hypotheses relate presidency security identity to issue area and allow for a more refined test of the argument that the reactions of the two outlier security identities, Atlanticist and neutral, are different from both other (non-committal) states and also from each other. The models in Table 3-8 include variables interacting both neutral and Atlanticist presidencies with security issues and, for neutral presidencies, with conflict resolution issues.⁵⁷ Both security identities contain clear predictions about their expected behavior on security issues – Atlanticists should prefer action through NATO and neutrals should prefer no action. Only the neutral identity contains expectations, though, about behavior on conflict resolution issues. Support of activity in this field is a significant part of the neutral identity, at least as practiced by the states in this sample, and so we should expect a positive effect of the interaction.⁵⁸

Table 3-8 shows the by-now standard pattern of significance across *Common Strategies*, *EP* activity, and *Commission* behavior. Among the issue areas, *Human Rights* and *Regional Integration* remain clearly insignificant and *Democratization* remains significant and positive.

Table 3-8. Interaction Effects in EU Cooperation.

	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>
<i>All Security Issues</i>	0.332	0.264	0.105
<i>All Conflict Resolution Issues</i>	0.469	0.273	0.043
<i>All Human Rights Issues</i>	0.074	0.241	0.380
<i>All Democratization Issues</i>	0.397	0.161	0.007
<i>Regional Integration Issues</i>	0.203	0.236	0.195
<i>Common Strategy</i>	1.000	0.355	0.003
<i>European Parliament</i>	1.033	0.260	0.000

⁵⁷ The tacit interaction of *Neutral Presidencies* and *Atlanticist Presidencies* drops as the categories are mutually exclusive.

⁵⁸ Switzerland, whose neutrality is perhaps most easily understood, does not typically act on this component of the ‘neutral’ identity. This is perhaps because its confederal system of government produces only a weak prime minister who may lack the international credibility to be an effective global presence. While none of the other neutral states here – Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland – are particularly powerful or strong states, each of their prime ministers has engaged in international mediation at some point, and all four contributed to a range of UN peacekeeping missions during the period of interest.

<i>Commission</i>	0.133	0.363	0.357
<i>Atlanticist Presidency</i>	-0.080	0.140	0.284
<i>Neutral Presidency</i>	-0.338	0.240	0.080
<i>Neutral Pres. * Conflict Res.</i>	1.431	0.524	0.003
<i>Neutral Pres. * Security</i>	0.070	0.450	0.439
<i>Atlanticist Pres.* Security</i>	-0.428	0.346	0.108
<i>Constant</i>	-0.996	0.207	0.000
Log pseudolikelihood	-147.14		
Pseudo-R ²	0.135		
<i>N</i>	282		
Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. <i>p</i> -values represent one-tailed tests.			

From there, however, the results begin to diverge from earlier models. Considering first the components of the interaction terms, *Security* is borderline significant ($p < 0.105$) in the presence of the interaction terms, suggesting that states with no distinct security identity (the noncommittal states, who comprise the excluded category for this variable) are more willing to use the EU for security matters than the outliers are. The positive and significant coefficient on *Conflict Resolution* suggests that the marginal effect of conflict resolution issues among non-committal and Atlanticist states is positive. *Atlanticist Presidencies* are negatively related to cooperation (though the coefficient is insignificant); *Neutral Presidencies* are now significant and negatively related to cooperation. Both of these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 11.

The interactions, though, tell another story. Interacting *Neutral Presidencies* and *Security* issues produces no significant effect, but a very large positive effect appears on the interaction of *Neutral Presidencies* and *Conflict Resolution* issues. As Table 3-9 shows, a non-conflict resolution issue with a noncommittal presidency has a 16.42% chance of receiving a CFSP reaction (Cell A); this is a baseline probability of cooperation for most events. As we vary the two elements of interest, for example to a non-committal presidency *with* a conflict resolution issue (Cell B), we observe a near doubling of the probability of cooperation, to 30.33%. Altering, instead, to a conflict resolution issue and a neutral presidency (Cell C) produces a *decrease* of

6.49%, thanks to the negative coefficient on *Neutral Presidencies*. Finally, when we observe both a neutral presidency and a conflict resolution issue (Cell D), the probability of a CFSP reaction jumps by an astounding 53.77%, to a total 70.19% probability of cooperation.

These strong results for *Neutral Presidencies* fail to emerge for other outlier presidencies. In contrast to the models in Table 3-7, *Atlanticist Presidencies* are no longer significantly related to cooperation. Their interaction with security issues produces a negative coefficient, though, and is marginally significant ($p < 0.108$, one-tailed test). The cumulative effect of a security issue with an Atlanticist presidency is to reduce the baseline in Cell A of Table 3-9 by 3.21%, to a total of 13.21% chance of response.

Table 3-9. The Effects of Neutral Presidencies and Conflict Resolution Issues.

<i>Neutral Presidency</i>	<i>Conflict Resolution Issue</i>	
	No	Yes
No	A. 16.42% (baseline)	B. 30.33% (13.91%)
Yes	C. 9.93% (-6.49%)	D. 70.19 (53.77%)

Notes: Top entry is total probability, bottom entry is change from baseline value (Cell A). Predicted probabilities generated using CLARIFY and coefficient estimates from Table 8, with the exception of clustered standard errors. Cell entries may not sum precisely due to rounding.

Taken together, the models in this section suggest that presidency effects do exist, with neutral and Atlanticist presidencies both less likely to preside over foreign policy cooperation. The exception to this negative trend is conflict resolution issues, where neutral presidencies demonstrate a marked willingness to engage in foreign policy cooperation. The finding of presidency effects in CFSP cooperation contradicts repeated evidence in the EU studies literature – and indeed, the Council’s own *Presidency Handbook* – on the norm of presidency neutrality.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ (European Union. General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. 2001).

During a period when the state holds the presidency, it is expected to set aside its national interests and work in the interests of the Union. The bulk of the evidence for this proposition comes from “Pillar I” (EC/economic) issues, however, and the findings here may be evidence of a different dynamic operating in CFSP (Pillar II).⁶⁰

A Consolidated Model

The models above segregated variables into conceptually related groups. What does a consolidated model tell us? The model specification in Table 3-10 includes all of the variables used in previous models. The inclusion of the security interaction terms precludes the disaggregation of security issues into their domestic and international components (as in Table 3-5); instead, we must pool them into *All Security Issues*.

The results differ strikingly from the segregated models. The baseline probability of cooperation now is 10.97%, which is notably lower than in most prior models.⁶¹ None of the variables reflecting ideas about ‘cooperation in general’ were significant in the earlier specifications; here, *Socialization* (time in months) has a significantly positive effect. Moving *Socialization* from its median (64 months, reflected in the baseline value) to its 75th percentile (93 months) increases the probability of cooperation by 5.65%. As discussed above, the process driving the change in behavior may be more of a rationalist perception updating one rather than a socialization one, but the model here is unable to distinguish. At a minimum, this model clearly

⁶⁰ Schalk et al. (2007) and Dür and Mateo (2004) address presidency norms and treaty-level bargaining. Edwards (2006) provides evidence from elite interviews that national interests regularly influence CFSP.

⁶¹ In all predicted probability reports in this section, *Saliency*, *Socialization* and *Preference Dispersion* are at their means. All other variables are held at their medians, which is 1 for *Enlargement* and *Amsterdam* and 0 for all others. As with all other CLARIFY estimates, robust standard errors are omitted.

suggests that some form of learning – either an individual form or a social form – occurs over time, so that the group finds reaching consensus easier as time passes.

The variables capturing characteristics of foreign policy as a broader issue area produce largely the same results as in the earlier models. *Saliency* continues to have a strong and positive relationship to cooperation, as do *Conflict Resolution Issues*; moving *Saliency* from its mean (reflected in the baseline) to one standard deviation above its mean increases the probability of cooperation by 7.73%. Geographic location continues to be insignificant. Given the context of the EU and its immediate interests in its neighbors, both as sources of potential instability and as candidates for EU membership, this insignificance is somewhat surprising.⁶² This model is unable to test arguments about all crisis issues, or about domestic and international security issues, but it does produce a positive significant effect for *All Security Issues* (domestic and international).

Table 3-10. Consolidated Probit Model of EU Activity.

	Coeff	Robust SE	<i>p</i>
<i>Preference Dispersion</i>	-0.050	0.108	0.323
<i>Socialization (time)</i>	0.011	0.007	0.048
<i>Centralization</i>	-0.598	0.503	0.117
<i>Enlargement</i>	-0.116	0.554	0.417
<i>Enlargement 4</i>	-0.319	0.497	0.261
<i>All Security Issues</i>	0.346	0.234	0.070
<i>All Conflict Res. Issues</i>	0.511	0.269	0.029
<i>Greater European Region</i>	0.048	0.141	0.367
<i>Saliency (logged)</i>	0.472	0.140	0.001
<i>All Human Rights Issues</i>	0.118	0.207	0.285
<i>All Democratization Issues</i>	0.435	0.180	0.008
<i>Regional Integration</i>	0.301	0.144	0.019
<i>Common Strategy</i>	0.815	0.360	0.012
<i>European Parliament</i>	1.120	0.254	0.000
<i>Commission</i>	0.117	0.397	0.385

⁶² The EU may convey its interest in events in these states through channels other than the CFSP, such as the quarterly Accession Councils held with prospective members

<i>Atlanticist Presidency</i>	-0.084	0.177	0.317
<i>Neutral Presidency</i>	-0.363	0.174	0.019
<i>Neutral Pres. * Conflict Res. Issues</i>	1.450	0.463	0.001
<i>Neutral Pres. * Security Issues</i>	0.168	0.450	0.355
<i>Atlanticist Pres. * Security Issues</i>	-0.394	0.372	0.145
<i>Constant</i>	-2.951	1.402	0.018
Log pseudolikelihood	-136.48		
Pseudo-R ²	0.197		
<i>N</i>	282		
Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. <i>p</i> -values represent one-tailed tests.			

Security Issues and *Conflict Resolution Issues* comprise two of the five issue areas that the EU's founding Treaty specifies as its CFSP priorities. Of the rest, *Human Rights Issues* continue to have no statistically significant relationship to cooperation. Given the amount of literature on the EU's activity in this issue area, both through CFSP and other tools, this finding is somewhat surprising.⁶³ The coefficients on *Democratization* and *Regional Integration* are both significant and positive. This is true for *Regional Integration* even in the presence of a control for Commission activity, where much of the practical support for regional integration elsewhere emerges.⁶⁴ EP activity and the existence of a *Common Strategy* continue to have their usual strong and positive effects. Issues or events on which the EP has acted are 31.56% more likely to receive a CFSP response than those with no EP attention.⁶⁵ In this consolidated model, both the short-term/recently-generated consensus of a Common Strategy and the long-term/underlying consensus of Treaty inclusion appear to increase the chances of a CFSP response.

The variables reflecting presidency security policy orientation also continue to have similar effects as above. *Atlanticist Presidencies* are no more or less likely than noncommittal ones to preside over cooperation. On the other hand, *Neutral Presidencies* are significantly less

⁶³ See, e.g., (Williams 2004), (K. E. Smith 2006).

⁶⁴ The effect of *Commission* activity itself continues to be insignificant, though.

⁶⁵ Again, coding procedures prohibit conclusions about causality.

likely to preside over cooperation – the probability of observing a CFSP response decreases by 4.71%, or nearly half of its baseline value. As preference outliers, these states appear to use their agenda power to take advantage of the lack of consensus and obtain outcomes nearer their own ideal points. On conflict resolution issues, however, the neutrals continue to be very active. A neutral presidency facing a conflict resolution issue increases the probability of a CFSP response by an enormous 48.92%, even in the presence of all the variables proposed by other hypotheses.⁶⁶

F-tests of *Neutral Presidency*, *Neutral * Security Issue*, and *Neutral * Conflict Resolution Issue* show that the three terms are jointly significant ($p < 0.015$). This indicates that in general, neutral presidencies do behave differently on all forms of security and conflict resolution issues. Atlanticist states, however, show no such pattern. Joint tests of *Atlanticist Presidency* and *Atlanticist Presidency * Security Issue*, and of *Atlanticist Presidency* and *Security Issue*, both fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.257$ and $p < 0.230$, respectively, two-tailed tests). These states do not behave differently in any statistically distinguishable manner from non-committal states.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored factors that drive states to cooperate in foreign policy in a formal international organization, and in particular it studies those factors influencing when states choose to cooperate within the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy framework. The answer to "when do states cooperate through international institutions?" involves a number of elements related to institutional and issue area characteristics.

⁶⁶ This predicted probability holds *Saliency* at its mean. Since most crisis issues have *Saliency* levels above the mean, however, the true increase is probably even larger.

Several variables clearly affect states' ability to reach consensus on a common response. In particular, salience has a substantial effect. Highly salient or prominent events have a much greater chance of obtaining a CFSP response. This effect is consistent across all models. Events that can tap a pre-existing consensus, whether from a Common Strategy or from the EU's Treaty basis, also have a significantly higher chance of cooperation. Human rights is the only issue area specified in the Treaty that never attains statistical significance; this is perhaps because the current measurement conflates both positive human rights developments and negative ones.⁶⁷

Distribution problems themselves, as measured by the left-right preference dispersion of member governments, fail to predict cooperation in any model specification. Other indicators related to distribution problems, however, perform somewhat better. An indicator of whether an Atlanticist state holds the presidency is negatively related to cooperation, though in some models it fails to reach statistical significance even in the more generous one-tailed tests. Atlanticist states holding the EU's presidency are somewhat less prone to cooperation, but the finding is not robust.

Indicators of neutral state presidencies perform more consistently, producing negative and significant effects in all models. The effect is reversed, however, on conflict resolution issues. In these cases, neutral presidencies are operating on issues that are consistent with their self-perceived security identity, and the interaction term produces a statistically significant and substantively quite large positive effect.

⁶⁷ Running Table 3-10's consolidated model with separate indicators for positive and negative human rights developments does not substantially improve the model's fit (model not shown). *Positive Human Rights Issues* is just barely significant ($p < 0.100$, one-tailed test) and positively signed, but *Negative Human Rights Issues* is nowhere near significant ($p < 0.450$, one-tailed test). Most EU human rights proponents would have expected a reverse effect, with strong positive effects for *Negative Human Rights Issues*.

The EU, however, is not the only institution for European foreign policy cooperation. Several others exist, and their existence may influence decisions to conduct cooperation through the EU. The use of an institution is a choice, as is the decision on *which* institution to use. We are also unable to test variables related to capacity in the context of a single organization, since the EU varies only slightly in both membership and “own capabilities” over time.⁶⁸ Chapter 4 examines these effects by considering variables about both capacity and consensus across four European foreign policy venues.

⁶⁸ “Own capabilities” are capabilities of the institution itself rather than of its member-states. Examples include NATO’s ownership of several AWACS planes and its own situation center. The EU later acquires a satellite center (inherited on the dismantling of the Western European Union), but it continues to lack any non-bureaucratic capabilities of its own other than the Commission’s pool of foreign aid money.